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Island Resistance:
Two Popular Movements for Political Change
in the Era of Confederation
WHEN THE EDITOR OF ACADIENSIS ASKED ME to write a review essay on Ian
Ross Robertson’s The Tenant League of Prince Edward Island, 1864-1867:
Leasehold Tenure in the New World (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996), he
encouraged me to include in the review any other books I thought relevant. In many
ways the most relevant book I could think of was my own The Red River Rebellion
(Winnipeg, Watson & Dwyer, 1996), since it too dealt with a popular uprising of the
1860s. The result is this essay, which is not a conventional review essay so much as
it is a comparative essay based upon the two books.
The decade of the 1860s, as Ian Robertson points out in his book on the Tenant
League of Prince Edward Island, has traditionally been seen as a decade of
transportation and communication improvements, as well as of intercolonial union. In
British North America, however, the decade also saw two major extraparliamentary
movements for political change, on both the eastern and western flanks of the
provinces that became Canada in 1867. One occurred in Prince Edward Island in the
mid-1860s. The other took place in the Red River Settlement in 1869-70. Both
involved jurisdictions that would join Confederation in the years shortly after
Confederation.
At first glance Prince Edward Island and the Red River Settlement do not appear
to have very much in common. But further reflection suggests that such a view would
be greatly mistaken. In the first place, both jurisdictions were islands, historically
insulated from the remainder of the continent and very much on the margins of
Empire. We do not often think of Red River as an island, but it was indeed an isolated
territory surrounded not by water, but by a veritable ocean of virtually unsettled land
for hundreds of miles in all directions. The earlier communications problems that had
afflicted Prince Edward Island, especially in winter, still beset Red River in 1869. It
took a minimum of two weeks to get a message from the settlement to the nearest
railhead and telegraph station, located in Minnesota, and a minimum of two weeks to
receive a reply.
In the second place, both Prince Edward Island and Red River had a historic
connection with Thomas Douglas, the Fifth Earl of Selkirk, the leading proponent of
Highland emigration to British North America in the early years of the 19th century.
Selkirk had placed his first Highland settlement on Prince Edward Island in 1803. It
had been successful, and it proved extremely influential in the subsequent
development of the Island. A few years later, Selkirk attempted to parlay his Island
success into an even grander settlement scheme at the forks of the Red and
Assiniboine Rivers. This scheme had not been a great triumph, although the “Selkirk
Settlers” were by the late 1860s seen in Red River as its “Pilgrim Fathers”. Selkirk
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had hoped to employ a Highland soldier residing on Prince Edward Island — Captain
John MacDonald — as his first governor in Red River. Only when MacDonald
refused to serve did Selkirk make the disastrous appointment of Miles Macdonell.
Perhaps even more profoundly, both Prince Edward Island and Red River had been
subjected to the introduction of anachronistic European institutions at the time of their
founding. In both cases the continuation of these anachronisms became a major
grievance for the settlers. In the case of Prince Edward Island, the anachronism was a
proprietorial system of landholding. The Island had been in advance of settlement
distributed by lottery to proprietors who were expected to lease their lands to tenant
farmers. Both the proprietorial system and the prevalence of leaseholding continued
well into the 19th century, where they became the target of public demonstration and
uprising. In Red River, the anachronism was a 17th-century trading company, which
claimed by its charter sovereign ownership of all the land and a monopoly of all trade.
The Hudson’s Bay Company had always been uneasily involved with Red River, and
it purchased ownership of the settlement from the Selkirk family in 1835. As a result,
the Company administered the Red River Settlement — it never became a formal
Crown “colony” — under its charter monopoly. The Hudson’s Bay Company
monopoly not only affected government, trade and the administration of justice, but it
also had a profound and continuing influence on landholding patterns.
Thus in both Prince Edward Island and Red River, the critical public issue was
intimately bound up in the question of land tenure and ownership. Sixty-one percent
of Island land occupiers in 1861 were either tenants or squatters. Squatters could get
legal standing either by 20 years’ uninterrupted, uncontested occupancy, or by
accepting a lease. Most leases were for 999 years, with the usual rent one shilling
(sterling) per acre per year. Tenants had perpetual tenure if the rent was paid, but if it
was not, they became liable to eviction, the spectre of all tenants. Many proprietors
refused to sell freehold title to tenants, and they set high prices to discourage sales. In
Red River, it was impossible to get documentary evidence of the tenures under which
various settlers held their land. Some settlers had received grants in fee simple from
Selkirk or his successors; a few others had bought land from the Selkirk estate. But
most were subject to the deed offered by the Hudson’s Bay Company after 1844. This
document was not a deed in fee simple, but of 1,000 years peppercorn tenure, based
upon a whole series of collateral prohibitions and obligations which amounted to a
civic contract with the Hudson’s Bay Company. The settler agreed not to evade the
Company’s trading monopoly or trade in furs or sell spirituous liquors. Settlers also
agreed to contribute to the expenses of all public establishments and to help with
roadworks for up to six days per year. They could not alienate any part of their land
without the permission in writing of the Governor and Company. The deed was not
valid if not registered in six months, and any violation of its terms abrogated the
agreement and rendered the land subject to forfeit. By comparison with this feudal
retrogression, leasehold in Prince Edward Island was quite straightforward. Not
surprisingly, few Red River settlers applied for a deed, and most were regarded by the
Company as simply squatters, as Sir George Simpson explained patiently to a
parliamentary investigation in 1857. The Company also set artificially high prices for
land under deed in outlying parts of the settlement, in an attempt to discourage the
spread of population, which would be hard and expensive to govern.
Further complicating landholding in Red River was the question of aboriginal title.
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The Company was prepared to regularize landholding only for two miles on either
side of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers. This was the territory that Lord Selkirk had
ostensibly purchased from the aboriginal inhabitants by treaty in 1817, a purchase that
was disputed by the chiefs of the local tribes. The vast bulk of the population of the
settlement, however, were mixed bloods, who claimed aboriginal rights to all the land
of the West by virtue of their descent from the first inhabitants. One mixed blood
spokesman in 1860 argued that “seeing no satisfactory arrangement has yet been
made for the lands, I think it not unlikely that the ‘Halfbreeds’ of the country —
representatives of the Crees and other tribes — might put in a good claim. They are
natives; they are present occupants; and they are the representatives of the first owners
of the soil, with whom...no satisfactory arrangement has ever been made”.
Both Islanders and Red River settlers had attempted unsuccessfully to petition the
Colonial Office for reform. But both the Island proprietors and the Hudson’s Bay
Company were too powerful to be undercut by local initiatives with popular support.
In 1839 William Cooper on behalf of the Island’s legislative assembly had gone to
London to attempt to arrange for a court of escheat on the Island, but Lord John
Russell had refused to see him. Subsequent legislative efforts in the early 1850s to
gain royal assent for tenant compensation bills and taxes on the nominal rentals of
landlords failed. In 1847 a petition signed by 977 Métis of Red River was brought by
Alexander Isbister before Colonial Secretary Earl Grey. The petition had three
requests. First, the petitioners asked to be governed according to the principles of the
British constitution. Secondly, they wanted the liberty of trade which prevailed
elsewhere in the Empire, so that they would not continue to be “reduced to a kind of
slavery”. (Prince Edward Island rhetoric also was filled with talk about “a kind of
slavery”.) Finally, they wanted land sold to new immigrants, with the proceeds used
to improve transportation. “We are near the boundary line; we can go over to the
neighbouring territory”, the petition concluded, “but we admire the wisdom of the
British Constitution, and we desire its privileges”. A second document, generated by
a committee of English-speaking mixed bloods, had as its first section “That several
individuals are complaining that the Company have obliged them to pay for lands
without giving them any contract in legal form, and in spite of their will, the officers
of the Company retaining upon the wages of their servants the price of the same lands,
which price has been placed, not in the municipal bank, but in that of the Company.
Is it then, that the Company might have the property of the lands? This appears to us
inseparably united to the rights of the Crown”. Isbister simplified these two statements
to one request: “That all lands sold to settlers should be legally secured to them”. This
was the first of a whole series of Red River attempts to become a Crown Colony, all
of which were ignored by the Colonial Office.
If there were underlying similarities between the situations of Prince Edward
Island and Red River in the 1860s, there were also more similarities between the
popular uprisings of that decade than might have been imagined. In both places
Confederation lurked in the background of the popular agitation. On the Island at the
same time that the Tenant League was emerging popular sentiment was mounting
against the idea of union with Canada. Islanders recognized that, given the small
population of the colony, it was unlikely to have much clout in the new union. There
was little or no evidence that Canada would be helpful in solving the Land Question,
which seemed far more pressing than union. In Red River, of course, the settlement
Review Essays/Notes critiques 137
had been sold as part of Hudson’s Bay Company territory to the government of
Canada in 1869. The local inhabitants had not been consulted or even informed about
the transfer, and they understood quite correctly that they were to be governed initially
as a colony of Canada. Red River was to enter Confederation, but hardly on its own
terms.
Whatever the political resonances, land rights were clearly at the heart of both
popular uprisings. A land commission had reported unanimously in 1861 on the Land
Question on Prince Edward Island, recommending that most tenants be given the right
to purchase their leaseholds from landlords, with long-term arrearages forgiven. To
settle the purchase price, the commission advised a form of compulsory arbitration.
The proprietors convinced the British government to reject these recommendations.
Instead, 12 proprietors agreed to allow the Island legislature to pass a Fifteen Years
Purchase Bill in early 1864, which set a price (15 years rent plus arrears) popularly
regarded as much too high. Frustrated with the conventional political process, Island
farmers organized the Tenant League on 19 May 1864. Its goal was to end the
leasehold system by extrapolitical means, mainly through organized withholding of
rentals and social ostracism. The pledge taken by League members was “to resist the
distraint, coercion, ejection, seizure and sale for rent and arrears of rent”.
In Red River, the Métis had began their opposition to the Canadian takeover by
forcing the Canadian surveyors, who had begun surveys of land before the actual
transfer to Canada had occurred, to cease their operations. The Company’s governor
in the settlement had already warned his superiors that “It is unfortunate that any
Survey should be commenced till the Canadian Government was in authority here, as
the whole land question is fruitful of future troubles which it will take much time and
great labour to settle”. He added, “I expect that as soon as the survey commences the
Halfbreeds and Indians will at once come forward and assert their right to the land and
probably stop the work until their claim is satisfied”. When John S. Dennis, the head
of the Canadian survey team met on 1 October 1869 with a spokesman for the Métis,
a young man named Louis Riel, the discussion revolved around the intentions of the
Canadian government regarding the extinction of Indian title and the disposition of
the land already occupied within the Red River settlement. Riel did not accept Dennis’
assurances that the Canadian government sought only to provide proper deeds for
occupiers. The Métis soon organized a “national committee”, and because of the
unusual circumstances of the takeover, their resistance became much more general.
The insurgents blocked the arrival of the new Canadian officials (leading Canada to
refuse to take possession of the territory until it was pacified), organized a provisional
government, and eventually negotiated with Canada for their rights.
As was usually the case in 19th-century British North America, in both Prince
Edward Island and Red River the system of law enforcement quickly proved
incapable of coping with popular protest movements. The problem was that there
were few professional policemen, and those temporarily conscripted often supported
the protesters. At the first signs of armed resistance, the government of the Island
requested British soldiers, since it feared that local volunteers and militia were too
sympathetic to the Tenant League. The British military authorities at Halifax were
reluctant, but two companies of troops were sent. The presence of the military, Ian
Robertson reports, killed the Tenant League as a formal organization. The British
military had also been employed on several occasions by the Hudson’s Bay Company,
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most notably in 1846 when a regiment of Royal Canadian Rifles had been dispatched
to Red River to keep the local population of Red River under control. But there were
no troops in Red River in 1869, and those dispatched in 1870 ended up more as an
army occupying the territory than as a force serving only to assist the civil authorities.
Finally, both of these movements of extraparliamentary political resistance were at
least qualified successes. Did the Tenant League help to achieve the rapid demise of
leasehold tenure on Prince Edward Island? Most Island historians and many
contemporaries have implicitly argued that it did not, by virtually ignoring the League
as an important factor in Island politics. Ian Robertson’s case is circumstantial, but
convincing. The leasehold system was not disappearing of its own accord, and indeed
in 1864 the Island was only reaching the point when leasehold would become really
economically attractive to landlords. A number of critical estates were sold to tenants
during the heyday of the Tenant League agitation, probably less because of direct
pressure than because the landlords could themselves see the long-term difficulties of
asserting their rights in the face of organized public opinion. In Red River, the Métis
uprising was at first glance much more demonstrably successful. The provisional
government headed by Louis Riel sent delegates to Ottawa in the spring of 1870, who
successfully negotiated the entrance of Red River into Confederation as the province
of Manitoba, with a substantial land reserve set aside for the Métis. Such a resounding
success was only superficial, however. Canada took possession of its new province at
the point of a gun, backed by an army. Riel and the other leaders of the provisional
government were not allowed to become the leaders of the new provincial
government, but were instead hounded for years by the authorities as fugitives from
justice because of their involvement with the execution of Thomas Scott. The Métis
land reserves became a quagmire of political controversy. Within 15 years the Métis
were again challenging Canada in armed rebellion, this time with visibly tragic
results.
Despite some very real underlying similarities the ultimate shape of the popular
uprisings in Red River and Prince Edward Island proved to be quite different. The
reasons for these differences are complex, but are clearly related to three points:
perceptions of the nature of “the people” in the two jurisdictions; questions of
leadership; and real differences in the employment of violence in the two movements.
Although it is not a point that he makes explicit, it is clear from Robertson’s
account that the popular uprising on Prince Edward Island — unlike its counterparts
in Ireland, Scotland and indeed Red River — was not linked with any “national”
aspirations by those who were involved. Certainly in both Ireland and Scotland, the
Land Question had become inextricably connected with what some scholars have
labelled “romantic nationalism”. Landholding patterns in the Celtic portions of the
British Isles were intimately bound up with culture, language, political rights and
ancient traditions. On Prince Edward Island, landholding patterns were pretty much
perceived as simple economic exploitation by a tenantry which had the vote and
which did not represent a single ethnic or confessional group. There appears to be no
evidence that the Tenant League or its members had any cultural, linguistic or
political aspirations beyond the achievement of freehold tenure. There was not even
any public invocation of the distinctiveness of the Island. Certainly the Red River
Métis, in contrast, did conceive of themselves as a historic people, and their resistance
was, curiously enough, more comparable to Irish and Scottish protest of the 19th
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century than was the very limited agenda of the Tenant Leaguers. The Métis were not
entirely united in religious and cultural terms, but they certainly saw themselves as a
distinct people, a “nation”, and their protest had profound political overtones quite
apart from the peculiar power vacuum in which they found themselves able to operate.
One suspects that a large part of the difference in the leadership component of the
two extraparliamentary movements is related to their quite disparate aspirations. The
Tenant League’s goals were sufficiently modest that it could operate on the basis of a
leadership without major commitment or visibility. A ten-member Central Committee
appears to have been headed by three individuals who were not tenant farmers, but
none were particularly prominent, either as Island residents or League leaders. The
secretary, Alexander McNeill, gained publicity because he was a schoolmaster who
came under attack by the Board of Education for his Tenant League involvement; he
ultimately disavowed his support of the League. George F. Adams appears to have left
the Island by the time of the 1866 elections. When the Island government sought to
suppress the organization, it was difficult to establish who actually was in charge. In
Red River, on the other hand, a charismatic leader had quickly appeared in the person
of Louis Riel. At first Riel had operated behind the scenes, using a Métis named John
Bruce as a front man. But by the time of the creation of the first provisional
government in December 1869, Riel had emerged as president. His power grew
substantially over the following months, backed as it was by the only organized armed
force in the settlement.
The whole question of the use of force and recourse to violence ultimately appears
quite different on Prince Edward Island than in Red River. To some extent these
appearances are deceptive. It is true that the worst personal violence that Tenant
League supporters ever produced was the broken arm of a deputy sheriff. Islanders
pulled back from serious bloodshed. Their display of arms and manifestations of force
were highly ritualistic. As Robertson notes, “No one on either side during the Tenant
League disturbances appears at any time to have fired a weapon with the intent of
hitting someone”. Interestingly enough, despite a good deal of military posturing, the
same observation could almost be made about Red River. Small armies marched back
and forth across the territory, men were arrested and imprisoned, and executions were
threatened. But virtually no serious injury had been done to anyone on any side until
that fateful day in March when Thomas Scott was executed. An escaped prisoner got
frostbite and lost some toes. A young man was shot by a prisoner attempting to escape
confinement at Kildonan in February and later died. His parents successfully pleaded
with the settlement not to make the death the occasion for a bloodbath. His killer was
roughed up by the crowd which speedily recaptured him, and he too subsequently
died. Most contemporaries regarded these two fatalities as accidental rather than
calculated, and in any event they were incidents away from the main flow of the
action. It was upon the death of Thomas Scott that all attention became focused.
Scott’s execution led directly to the outlawing of Louis Riel and excused — in the
minds of many Ontarians — the fairly heavy-handed military occupation of Red River
in the late summer of 1870.
In a sense, the Island attitude towards violence to some considerable extent
explains the public over-reaction to the death of Thomas Scott. A ritualistic treatment
of violence really was the norm in both disturbances. Occasionally ritual got a bit out
of hand, and it was only fortuitous that no lives were ever accidentally lost in the
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melees surrounding the Tenant League agitation, as they were in Kildonan in
February 1870. But deliberate killing was different. Thomas Scott himself probably
put his finger on the key point when he told one eyewitness, “This is a cold-blooded
murder” and exclaimed to another, “This is horrible! This is cold-blooded murder. Be
sure to make a true statement”. For the “murder” of Scott, Ontario and the Canadian
government could never quite forgive Louis Riel and the provisional government.
Riel died in 1885 as much or more because of Scott than because of Duck Lake.
Two islands, two “successful” popular uprisings in British North America in the
era of Canadian Confederation. One of the uprisings is virtually unknown; the other
has been much misunderstood. Together they can tell us a good deal more about the
margins of the new nation than most Canadian historians have ever suspected.
J. M. BUMSTED
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